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Abstract
Samuel Zell’s acquisition of the Tribune Company in December 2007 using an S corporation employee stock
ownership plan (S ESOP) brought S ESOPs to national attention. An S ESOP is a trust that holds shares of an
S corporation (a closely held corporation whose shareholders are taxed on a pass-through basis similarly to
partners in a partnership) for the benefit of the corporation’s employees. S ESOPs, which have only existed
since 1998 are not as well known as C ESOPs, an ESOP that holds shares of a C corporation (a separately
taxed corporation). Enron, Polaroid and United Airlines, all of which had ESOPs when they went bankrupt,
were C corporations.
Perhaps because they have only existed for ten years, little academic attention has focused on S ESOPs. In this
paper we draw on the extensive existing employee ownership literature to describe the benefits and costs to
employees, to firms and to society at large from the legislation that authorizes S ESOPs, and, where possible,
we quantify these costs and benefits. We estimate that annual contributions to S ESOPs on behalf of
employees total $14 billion, which represent additional compensation that would not have been paid without
an ESOP. Annual gains attributable to increased job stability also save employees approximately $3 billion
annually. Accumulated stakes, which are essentially forced savings and usually do not displace other savings,
lead to additional annual accruals of $34 billion. Employers pay for ESOP contributions out of firm-level
productivity and sales gains of $33 billion annually attributable to employee ownership. We estimate that one
quarter of the annual gain, $8 billion ultimately goes to the federal treasury, which thereby also benefits from
the adoption of S ESOPs.
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Samuel Zell’s acquisition of the Tribune Company in December 2007 using an S corporation 
employee stock ownership plan (S ESOP) brought S ESOPs to national attention.  An S ESOP is a 
trust that holds shares of an S corporation (a closely held corporation whose shareholders are 
taxed on a pass-through basis similarly to partners in a partnership) for the benefit of the 
corporation’s employees. S ESOPs, which have only existed since 1998 are not as well known as C 
ESOPs, an ESOP that holds shares of a C corporation (a separately taxed corporation). Enron, 
Polaroid and United Airlines, all of which had ESOPs when they went bankrupt, were C 
corporations.  
 
Perhaps because they have only existed for ten years, little academic attention has focused on S 
ESOPs. In this paper we draw on the extensive existing employee ownership literature to describe 
the benefits and costs to employees, to firms and to society at large from the legislation that 
authorizes S ESOPs, and, where possible, we quantify these costs and benefits. We estimate that 
annual contributions to S ESOPs on behalf of employees total $14 billion, which represent 
additional compensation that would not have been paid without an ESOP. Annual gains 
attributable to increased job stability also save employees approximately $3 billion annually. 
Accumulated stakes, which are essentially forced savings and usually do not displace other 
savings, lead to additional annual accruals of $34 billion. Employers pay for ESOP contributions 
out of firm-level productivity and sales gains of $33 billion annually attributable to employee 
ownership. We estimate that one quarter of the annual gain, $8 billion ultimately goes to the 
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1 Freeman is Senior Lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Arts & Sciences and Resident Scholar at the School’s 
Center for Organizational Dynamics. Knoll is Theodore Warner Professor University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of 
Real Estate, The Wharton School; Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania. Financial support was 
provided by ESCA and the University of Pennsylvania. The views in this study are solely those of the authors. Copyright 2008 by 
Steve Freeman and Michael Knoll. All rights reserved. Preliminary draft. Not for quotation or attribution without the authors’ 
permission. 
2 The strike price of Zell’s option increases over time from $500 million to $590 million. 
3 Zell took control upon making a $250 million investment in the Tribune. In the second stage, his original investment was redeemed 
and he made an investment of $315 million. 
4 The new entity emerged with a staggering $13 billion of debt (Forbes Dec 20, 2007), $250 million of which was borrowed through 
the ESOP. 
5 In 1956, Kelso implemented for a San Francisco newspaper the first ownership transfer to employees by means of what later 
became known as The Kelso Plan. In 1958 he collaborated with the philosopher Mortimer Adler to write The Capitalist Manifesto 
outlining the economic, social and political benefits that would ensue from broad-based employee ownership.  
6 When the Social Security Act was signed by President Roosevelt in 1935, one out of 70 Americans were eligible for Social Security 
benefits. In 1939, Social Security was expanded to cover dependents and survivors. A 1967 comprehensive study revealed that 
one out of 17 Americans were then eligible for Social Security benefits, but that by the year 2000 one out of every three 
Americans would be eligible and that by the year 2010 it would be one out of two. For a perspective from that period, see Myers 
(1976). 

























  All ESOPs S ESOP % of total S ESOPs C ESOPs 
 # of Plans / firms 9,225 40% 3,690 5,535
 # of Participants (Millions) 11.2 33% (est.) 3.7 7.5
 Value of Plan Assets ($ Billions) $928 33% (est.) 306 622
 Participants / plan 1,214 33% (est.) 1,002 1,356

















                                                 
7  The original 1996 Act would not have lead to the establishment of many S ESOPs because of a glitch that imposed the unrelated 
business tax on such an ESOP.  In the following year, Congress removed that glitch and exempted from tax ESOPs holding 
shares of S corporation stock.  That technical change, which became effective January 1, 1998, conformed the tax treatment of S 
ESOPs with traditional C ESOPs. 
8 One reason we assume C ESOPs are, on average, larger, is that the 5% of ESOPs that are public companies (all of whom are C 
corps) have a mean of 13,984 employees compared to a mean of 1,460 for private companies. On the other hand, contributions, 
and therefore assets, are larger at private firms – 8-10% of payroll – compared to 4-6% of payroll at public companies, so there 
may be less of a difference – or no difference at all – in plan asset size. 














































                                                 
9 An ESOP association (2005) member survey indicates 13% of overall compensation, which would amount to over $6,000 per 
participant and almost 16% of pay; we believe this is implausibly high as an average, and use 13% of pay as a high estimate. An 
NCEO (2007) analysis of Form 5500 retirement plan filings filed by ESOP companies finds average contributions of $2,510, which 
would correspond to about 6% of pay. The authors of the NCEO study note that the “Form 5500 data are prone to considerable 
reporting and transcription error and should be used with caution.” One of the NCEO authors, Loren Rodgers, suggests that the 
NCEO figure would represent a low mark because Form 5500 may not include all contributions. 
10 The figure in the text is based on the mean civilian salary for all workers of $41,231, a figure which comes from the National 
Compensation Survey: Occupational Wages in the United States, June 2006 (U.S. Department of Labor U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics June 2007). The average salary for employee-owners is likely higher both because this figure includes many marginal 
jobs and jobs in marginal firms that would not include ESOPs, and because many lower paid new and probationary workers are 
usually not included in plans.  
11 Average Stock market return 1926-1999 Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2000 Yearbook (Ibbotson Associates, Inc.). 





































                                                 
12 Traditionally, economists and many managers have suspected that job stability comes at a cost to organizations.  However, as 
that stability has declined over the past generation, researchers have been identifying benefits of job stability not only for the 
employees themselves, but also for the investors who provide capital to such organizations (e.g., Pfeffer 2005). Blair, et al (2000) 
and Craig & Pencavel (1995) corroborate this thesis; the employee-owned firms with higher job stability also had higher 
productivity and better stock market performance than comparable non-employee-owned firms. 
13 Mean civilian salary for all workers is 41,231 (note 10). Value of benefits is estimated at 20% above that.  
14 BNET Business Network “Relocation's hidden costs” October 2002. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FXS/is_10_81/ai_93208706  
15 In 2001, six thousand Polaroid workers, lost not only retirement health care severance packages and in many cases their jobs, but 
also a $300 million ESOP investment. Beginning in 1988, workers at the Waltham, Mass. instant camera manufacturer gave up 
8% of their salary to underwrite an ESOP, created to thwart a corporate takeover. Unfortunately, Polaroid was slow to react to the 
digital revolution and began to lose money in the 1990s. From 1995 to 1998, the company racked up $359 million in losses. As its 
balance sheet deteriorated, so did the value of its stock, including shares in the ESOP. In October 2001, Polaroid sought 
bankruptcy protection from creditors. A company-appointed trustee sold the employee stake for 9¢ per share, having plummeted 
from $60 in 1997.  
16 At Enron, ESOP employee losses were further exacerbated by the precipitous decline of the Enron 401(k), 58% of which was 
invested in Enron stock, one of many discredited techniques employed by management to (artificially) prop up share price.  
17 Lamberg, et al (2003) argued that lack of central authority caused suboptimal strategic stakeholder negotiation at United Airlines, 
causing the firm to fall into bankruptcy (and employees to lose their investment). The empirical generalizability of the United 
Airlines case is questionable because it is an ESOP that many proponents considered ill-advised, and most considered badly 
structured. On the other hand, economists are inclined to see United Airlines’ problems as an acute example of a common 
problem. Ronald Coase won a Nobel Prize in Economics for identifying internal negotiations and suboptimization as a general 
economic problem for which his “Theory of the Firm,” that is to say the conventionally governed firm, is a solution.  
18 Kruse (1996) suggests that employee owners generally have superior retirement provisions even excepting their ESOP stake 
because their firms are far more likely than their industry counterparts to maintain defined benefit pension plans. But of course, if 
a company goes bankrupt, defined benefit pensions are lost too. More research is needed on the extent of this risk and whether 
ESOPs result in too many eggs in one basket, or if, in fact, the eggs best belong right there with the hens that make them. 













 Annual Individual Gains 
Aggregate Gain for all    
S ESOP Participants 
Average annual S ESOP firm contribution $3,700 $14 Billion 
Savings attributable to job stability $800 $3 Billion 
Annual Social Welfare Benefit $4,500 $17 Billion 
Average annual accrual equity stake ($82,900) $9,100 $34 Billion 
Annual Gains for S ESOP Employee Owners $13,600 $51 Billion 
Increased Work Satisfaction Positive, but difficult to quantify 

























… the studies show that on average, companies and their investors made a profit … over and 
above any ownership they dished out to employees. They gave workers an 8 percent ownership 
stake, and in return enjoyed an average of a 2 percentage point higher return on the diluted 
shares they still held.  
                                                 
19 Mainstream economic theory predicts employee ownership will lead to underinvestment, inefficient decision-making, inadequate 
supervision, or some combination of these (see Bonin, Jones, & Putterman, 1993, for a review), 
20 Pugh et al (1999, 2000), Beatty (1995), Scholes & Wolfson (1990) and Pugh, et al. (forthcoming) document that ESOPs have 
been used by corporations as part of a takeover defense and that these ESOPs under-perform the market. Gamble (2000) 
documents that as ESOP stock concentration increases, R&D spending declines. 



















































                                                 
21 Sometimes productivity is measured as a function of all inputs, capital, labor, materials; other times simply as a function of labor. 
Even if we had consistency in definitions, savings would vary depending on cost structures and profit margins. See appendix B for 
sensitivity analysis depending on certain assumptions about these cost structures.  
22 We don’t actually have average revenues, but we do have an estimate of plan participants per firm – slightly over 1,000. 
Assuming revenues per employee between $200,000 and $250,000 (US average: $210,000 according to Dun & Bradstreet Million 
Dollar Directory, 2002 edition), and that there may be P/T, probationary or temporary employees who are not plan participants, 
this works out to about $250 million in revenues per firm. 
 















 Benefits of ESOP to a $250M S Corp  
Aggregate Gain for all   
S ESOP Firms 
Average savings from 4% increased productivity $7 Million $26 Billion 
Additional profits from 2.5% increased sales $1.9 Million $7 Billion 
Risk from (Lack of) Diversification Employees generally protected against possible risks
Average total benefits $8.9 Million $33 Billion 
Annual firm contribution $3.7 Million $14 Billion 




























                                                 
23 Some finance scholars have been critical on the use of ESOPs in the 1980s as a takeover defense. For example, Beatty (1994) 
and Scholes and Wolfson (1990) claimed that the increase in C ESOPs in the 1980s was largely prompted by the surge at the 
time in hostile corporate takeovers. C ESOPs were an effective takeover defense because they increase both the number of 
shares under management control and corporate debt -- making them simultaneously less vulnerable and less attractive. 
24 That is not to say that taxes cannot have welfare consequences – they can – but their welfare consequences are not the same as 
their revenue consequences.  In general, the welfare consequences of a policy are more complicated to discern than the revenue 
consequences. 











































                                                 
25 In other words, we do not attempt to determine if there are less favorable tax regimes that would yield as large or almost as large 
benefits. Instead, we only seek to compare the tax revenue under the current regime with that from a regime that prohibited or 
effectively precluded ESOPs from owning shares in an S corporation. 
26 For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding the creation of S ESOPs, see Rosen (2005a). 
27 The corporate income tax is imposed under Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) Section 11 on corporate income as defined in 
subchapter C.  The provisions of that subchapter are set forth in Code Sections 301 through 385. 
28 These requirements are set forth in Code Section 1361.  For example, an S corporation can have no more than 100 shareholders; 
none of its shareholders can be C corporations or nonresident aliens.  In addition, the S corporation must be a domestic 
corporation and it cannot be engaged in certain lines of business. 
29 The reference to subchapter S is to subchapter S of chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code.  The provisions of that subchapter are set 
forth in sections 1361 through 1379 of the Code.   The election to be taxed as an S corporation requires unanimous consent of 
the shareholders.  Code Section 1362. 
30  Prior to 1998, if an ESOP held any shares of a corporation, the corporation would not be able to make the S election – and if it 
did, it would be ineffective.  As a result, such a corporation would be subject to corporate tax under subchapter C.  
31 It is rare for an S ESOP to transfer shares to a beneficiary because the sale of even a single share to a person not qualified to 
hold the shares of an S corporation would void the S election and cause the corporation to be taxed as a subchapter C 
corporation. 
32 ESOP participants can defer taxation still further by rolling over their withdrawals into an individual retirement account (IRA) or 
other qualified account. 




















































































































                                                 
33 Greenberg (1986) speculated on a “spillover” effect from employee ownership, that those who participate in workplace 
governance would generally increase political and civic participation. As far as we know, no one has tested this link directly, but 
political scientists (e.g., Schur, et al 2005) have begun investigating the relationship between workplace participation (not 
necessarily in employee-ownership) and citizenship. Given the established links between employee ownership and workplace 
participation, a finding of a relationship between workplace participation and citizenship would suggest that employee ownership 
does lead to citizenship behaviors. 
34 Firm survival is not generally understood by economists as a social benefit, and may even be seen as a social cost, the failure of 
the old to die and make way for new, innovative firms. Research on resilience however (e.g., Freeman 2004), suggests that there 











































                                                                                                                                                              
is a major social gain from organizations that survive – people need time to fit into an organization, teams need time to coalesce, 
organizations take years to develop successful business models – and a loss from lack of organizational continuity. Markets 
provide only crude mechanisms for reallocating resources. Bankruptcy and other breakups result in the disintegration of 
intellectual capital. Start-ups, for all their vibrancy, are generally inefficient. When individuals, teams, and organizations break up 
frequently, clients and other stakeholders often are poorly served. In short, the current model of transfer every two or three years 
may result in great social losses; if employee ownership, in fact, allows for resilient, organizations that can withstand adversity 
and adapt to changing circumstances, they may add a greatly beneficial stability to an all-too-rapidly changing economy and 
society. 
35 It’s widely presumed that home ownership is a cornerstone of society, adding stability to neighborhoods, and anchoring people in 
the civic life. Presumably, some research exists to back up these claims. It would seem parallel to claim the comparable 
importance of work ownership. “The Ownership Society” was a phrase used in the creation of ESOPs. It’s not an easy benefit to 
measure, but that doesn’t mean it’s not an actual effect (or worth trying to research). 
36 Because employees have rich links to the community, an increase in their welfare and power can benefit clients, suppliers and 
other external stakeholders. As compared with straightforward measures such as sales or employment growth, measuring with 
ownership stake or stakeholder relations is not easy, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth investigating. 
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# of Plans 9,225 35% 40% 45% 3,229 3,690 4,151 5,996 5,535 5,074
# of Participants (Millions) 11.2 25% 33% 40% 2.8 3.7 4.5 8.4 7.5 6.7
Value of Plan Assets ($ Billions) $928 25% 33% 40% 232 306 371 696 622 557
participants/plan 1,214 25% 33% 40% 759 1,002 1,214 1,518 1,356 1,214
 Assumed size difference S v C 759 354 0 















increased profits based on margins equaling 30% of total revenues. In the “Low margin, High var cost” right 
column scenarios, we assume 4% productivity savings on variable costs equaling 90% of total revenues and 








Annual increased profits for 
$250M S ESOP (Millions $) 
 
 





High var cost 
 Average savings from 4% increased productivity 5.0 7.0 9.0 
 Additional profits from 2.5% increased sales  3.1 1.9 .6 
 Total  8.1 8.9 9.6 
 









Annual increased profits for 
$250M S ESOP (Millions $) 
Annual Aggregate Gain for 
all S ESOPs (Billions $) 
Annual firm contribution 2.5 3.7 5.4 7 14 26 
Undistributed profits 2.7 5.2 7.4 7 20 33 
 
 
Appendix C. Sources of additional information about ESOPs and Employee 
Ownership 
 
• ESCA (Employee‐Owned S Corporations of America)  http://www.esca.us/   
ESCA is the Washington, DC voice for employee‐owned S corps.  ESCA’s mission is to preserve and protects S corp 
ESOPs and the benefits they provide to the employees who own them.  
 
• ESOP Association http://www.esopassociation.org/ 
The ESOP Association, founded in 1978, is a national non‐profit membership organization, with 18 local Chapters, 
serving approximately 2,400 ESOP companies, professionals with a commitment to ESOPs, and companies 
considering the implementation of an ESOP. (866) 366‐3832. 
 
• Kelso Institute  http://www.kelsoinstitute.org/  
 
• NCEO (National Center for Employee Ownership) http://www.nceo.org/  
The National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) is a private, nonprofit membership and research organization 
that aims to serve as the leading source of accurate, unbiased information on employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs), equity compensation plans, and ownership culture. 
 
• OEOC (Ohio Employee Ownership Center) http://dept.kent.edu/oeoc/.  
A university‐based program established in 1987 to provide outreach, information, and preliminary technical 
assistance to Ohio employees and business owners interested in exploring employee ownership. The OEOC provides 
ownership training on a single and multi‐company basis to existing employee‐owned firms and operates a listserv 
devoted to employee ownership issues: ownership@cog.kent.edu 
 
• Vermont Employee Ownership Center 
Executive Director, Don Jamison, 802‐861‐6611, don@veoc.org. (National Center for Employee Ownership) Chris 
Mackin cm@ownershipassociates.com of http://ownershipassociates.com/ 
 
